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Don't be so Negative: The Case for Positive Constitutional Voting
Rights Post-Shelby County and Beyond
INTRODUCTION

Among the numerous rights that citizens of the United States ("US") possess, few hold as
high a rank as the right to vote. President Ronald Reagan proclaimed that voting is the "crown
jewel" of American liberties. 1 President Lyndon Johnson exclaimed that voting "is the most
powerful instrument ever devised by man for breaking down injustice. " 2 The US Supreme Court
has declared that voting "is the essence of a democratic society."3 Voting has been declared a
fundamental right in the US because it is believed that the right to vote is preservative of all other
rights. 4

Stepping beyond the borders of the US, the right to vote has been declared a ''well-

established norm ofintemationallaw."5
With such soaring rhetoric used to describe the right to vote in the US, many are
surprised to learn that other countries throughout the world provide stronger constitutional
protections for voting rights than the US Constitution does.6 This fact is often surprising and at
times disturbing to US citizens.

This reality stems from the long held belief that the US

Constitution does not confer upon its citizens positive or affirmative entitlements to government
services, but rather "is a charter of negative liberties" restraining the government from action. 7
The reasons for this approach to interpreting the Constitution have been debated and
1

President Ronald Reagan, Remarks on Signing the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 (June 29, 1982).
President Lyndon Johnson, Remarks on Signing the Voting Rights Act (August 6, 1965).
3
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
4
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
5
Alexander Kirshner, The International Status of the Right to Vote, DEMOCRACY COALITION PROJECT,
2

http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/lnternationai_Status_of_the_Right_to_Vote.pdf.
Some have gone so far as to say that the US actually does not actually have a constitutional right to vote while
others operate somewhere in the middle. Regardless of the position one takes, it is clear that the US Constitution
does not provide an explicit right to vote. Rather the voting rights protected by the US Constitution have been
developed through a series of amendments and also broad interpretations of these amendments.
7
Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law Principles and Policies, 565 (Vicky Been et at. eds., 4th ed. 2011); see also
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 195-196 (1989).
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4

contemplated throughout history. But the purpose of this article is not to argue for an overall
. approach to drafting a constitution, i.e. positive versus negative rights, but rather is to argue that
regardless of the overall constitutional structure chosen by a country, the right to vote as a
. singular right should be defined in a country's constitution as an affirmative, positive right.
To show the necessity and benefits of defining the right to vote in such a manner, I have
· chosen a comparative approach, selecting countries who define their right to vote negatively,
statutorily and positively. Specifically, I have chosen four countries: the United States, India,
Canada and South Africa.

As a means of showing the distinctions between the different

. approaches I focus on cases in which the right to vote was challenged as it relates to prisoners'
voting rights. 8 This selection was chosen with the premise that countries that protect prisoners'
voting rights would have a strong constitutional right to vote and those who do not would have
an equally less protective constitutional right to vote. The cases selected all involved a similar
fact pattern: A prisoner or group of prisoners was deprived of their right to vote while in prison
and as a result challenged the law disenfranchising them under their country's constitution and
took the challenge to their country's highest court.
Part I of this article briefly discusses the distinction between positive rights and negative
rights. Part II will explore prisoners' voting rights in the US. Part III begins the comparative
analysis and explores prisoners' voting rights in three other countries: India, Canada and South
Africa. Part IV follows the comparative analysis and revisits the distinctions between positive
and negative rights and asks: what difference does it make? Finally, Part V briefly discusses the

8

One word of caution: this is not an article arguing for or against prisoner disenfranchisement- rather, these cases
were selected as a lens through which one could view how strongly a country protects its right to vote and the
correlation between the constitutional methods used to express the right. The benefit of using prisoners' voting
rights cases is that the cases provide almost identical laws applied to identical fact patterns across numerous
countries dealing with a similar right. The result is to see exactly how a country's highest court analyzes an
infringement on the right to vote.

5

relevance of voting rights today and proposes that the right to vote is unique in a democracy and
thus should be defined specifically in a constitution as an affirmative right regardless of the
overall structure of a country's constitution.

I.

POSITIVE RIGHTS AND NEGATIVE RIGHTS DEFINED

Put simply, positive rights require the government to do something and negative rights
prevent the government from doing certain things. 9 If it is true that the US Constitution is a
charter of negative liberties rather than positive rights, why was this choice made and what were
the competing alternatives?

Certainly the founding fathers had a reason for drafting the

Constitution in such a manner and history shows that the choice was not made casually. Many
reasons have been put forth explaining the choice. Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit
explained the choice made by the founding fathers succinctly in the case of Jackson v. City of
Joliet:
The men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that government might
do too little for the people but that it might do too much to them. The Fourteenth
Amendment, adopted in 1868 at the height of laissez-faire thinking, sought to
protect Americans from oppression by state government, not to secure them basic
governmental services. Of course, even in the laissez-faire era only anarchists
thought the state should not provide the type of protective services at issue in this
case. But no one thought federal constitutional guarantees or federal tort
remedies necessary to prod the states to provide the services that everyone wanted
provided. 10
This quote from Judge Posner explains that the reason the founding fathers chose a
negative constitutional structure over the positive alternative was because the concern was never
that the government would not provide necessary services but rather that the government would
attempt to do too much.

Although this approach certainly has merit it also can have

unanticipated consequences. As Jackson will later show and also the cases involving prisoners'

9

Susan Bandesna, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH.l. REV. 2271, 2279 (1990).
Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983).

10
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voting rights, the structure that was thought to protect citizens from government can also at times
be harmful. It can be used by the government to take away citizens' rights and also allow the
government to claim no obligation to engage in certain activities.

II.

TAKING AWAY A FELON'S RIGHT To VOTE IN THE UNITED STATES

Under the US Constitution, states may disenfranchise both felons and ex-felons. 11
Although the US Supreme Court has declared that inmates who are awaiting trial must be
provided with either an absentee ballot or other alternatives to voting, this does nothing for the
inmate who has been convicted. 12 With the understanding that the US historically has been a
very pro-democracy and pro-voting country it is important to understand the legal analysis that
the US Supreme Court engages in when they determine that the US Constitution does not
guarantee a person's right to vote when they have been convicted of a felony.

a. McDonald v. Board ofElection Commissioners
In McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, the Supreme Court held that the State
of Illinois's absentee voting statutes, which provided that absentee ballots be provided to those
medically unable to go to the polls, did not deny equal protection to those who were charged
with an offense and held awaiting trial. 13

In McDonald, a group of un-sentenced inmates

brought suit against the State of Illinois challenging a law that allowed absentee ballots only for
those who had a disability or would be outside their county of residence on Election Day. 14 The
practical effect of the law prevented inmates who were awaiting trial form being able to vote. 15
The inmates argued that since fundamental voting rights were involved there should be a
lesser presumption in favor of upholding the law than would normally accompany a challenge to
11

Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974).
O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 531 (1974); see also Chemerinskey, supra note 7, at 901.
13
McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802,810-811 (1969)
14
McDonald, 394 U.S. at 803-804.
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15

/d. at 803.
7

state legislation. 16 In upholding the law the Court explained that the states have long been held
to have wide latitude in detennining how voting is exercised. 17 The Court then decided what
standard of review was:required for examining the state law} 8 Although it appeared at first that
the Court would apply: strict scrutiny, the Court explained that despite the traditional habit of
more exacting scrutiny for laws aimed at restraining the right to vote, such exacting scrutiny was
unnecessary for two reasons. 19 The Court found that because the distinctions made under the law
were not made on wealth or race, strict scrutiny was not required. 20 Surprisingly, the Court also
held that the law did not act to deny the right to vote but rather, denied an absentee ballot. 21
Based upon these two conclusions the Court held that strict scrutiny was unnecessary and
instead applied "the more traditional standards for evaluating . . . equal protection claims" or
rational basis review.22 Thus, the laws would "be set aside only if no grounds c[ould] be
conceived to justify them."23 The Court stated that there was nothing to show that the pretrial
inmates were entirely prohibited from voting. 24

"Constitutional safeguards are not thereby

offended simply because some prisoners ... find voting more convenient than" those prisoners
challenging the law.

25

b. O'Brien v. Skinner

In Obrien v. Skinner, another group of inmates challenged a New York state law that
prohibited voting for those who were confined either awaiting trial or being held pursuant to a

16

17

ld. at 806.
Id. at 807.

18/d.
19/d.
20

McDonald, 394 U.S. at 808.
21/d.
22/d.
23

ld. at 809.
24/d.
25

/d. at 810.
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misdemeanor conviction.26 The inmates who challenged the law had attempted to "establish a
mobile voters' registration unit in the county jail in compliance with a mobile registration
procedure which had been employed in some county jails in New York State."27 The inmates
request was denied and as a result they requested to be transported to a polling place or else
provided absentee ballots.28 These requests were also denied.29 In denying the requests, the
election authorities stated that they were under no obligation to enable the inmates to vote and
that the inmates did not qualify for absentee ballots under the state law. 30
In analyzing the inmates' requests, the Supreme Court first noted that other than being
physically unable to get to the polling locations, the inmates were not disqualified from voting in
any other way. 31 The Court further noted that the law in question had a paradoxical effect where
an inmate who was incarcerated in a county other than the one of their primary residency could
apply for and receive an absentee ballot. 32 These inmates were deemed unavoidably absent from
their county and thus qualified for an absentee ballot. 33 On the other hand, inmates who were
confined in their county of primary residency were denied absentee ballots because they were
considered present for the purposes of voting and thus did not qualify for absentee ballots.

34

The Court held that the law was not constitutional because it discriminated between
categories of qualified voters in wholly arbitrary ways. 35 The Court distinguished McDonald,
explaining that in McDonald, the record did not show that inmates were absolutely barred from

26
27

O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 525 (1974).
O'Brien, 414 U.S. at 525.

28

ld. at 525.
/d. at 527.
30
Id. at 527.
31
/d. at 528.
32
ld. at 528-529.
33
O'Brien, 414 U.S. at 529.
29

34/d.
35

ld. at 530.

9

voting and the Court's holding rested on essentially a lack ofproof. 36 By contrast, the inmates in
0 'Brien were a category that was entirely precluded from voting and there was no failure of

proof- the inmates were able to show that if they were imprisoned in their county of residency
awaiting trial or serving a misdemeanor sentence they wouid not be accommodated at all.

37

As a

result of the complete bar to voting for this class of inma~es, the Court struck down the law as
violating equal protection38
Taken together, McDonald and 0 'Brien appear to: stand for the proposition that states
may not entirely prohibit non-felons from voting while awaiting trial or serving misdemeanor
sentences. 39 This will often be a matter of proof. As McDonald shows, sometimes the practical
effect of a law will not be deemed to equate to a complete bar and the law could be upheld.
States do not necessarily have to provide absentee ballots, but where they refuse, an alternative
means of voting must be supplied. 40 However, these minimal safeguards do not apply at all to
convicted felons.

c. Richardson v. Ramirez
In Richardson v. Ramirez the Supreme Court held that denying convicted felons the right
to vote does not violate equal protection in the US. In Richardson, three felons who had served
their sentence and were no longer in prison "filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Supreme
Court of California to compel California county election officials to register them as voters."41
The statute disenfranchised all "persons convicted of an 'infamous crime. "'42

The three

individuals argued that the California statute in question "denied them the right to equal
36

/d. at 529.
ld. at 530.
38
/d. at 531.

37

39

Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 901.
See McDonald, 394 U.S. at 810-811; O'Brien, 414 U.S. at 530-531.
41
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24,55-56 (1974).
42
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 26.
40
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protection of the laws under the Federal Constitution."43 Specifically, they argued (1) that the
state was required to show a compelling interest to disenfranchise the felons and this could no
longer be shown in regard to ex-felons and (2) that because there was such a lack of uniformity
in the~application of such laws throughout California, there was a denial of due process. 44 The
California Supreme Court held that the statute was a denial of equal protection under the
Constitution "as applied to all ex-felons whose terms of incarceration and parole have expired"
and never reached the question of due process. 45
On review of the California decision, the Supreme Court noted that the argument that was
being made by the state relied upon Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment which discussed the
denial of voting to persons who participated "in rebellion, or other crime[s].',46

Justice

Rehnquist, writing for the majority, recounted the minimal legislative history that was available
regarding Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 47 Despite being limited, the majority found
the language of Section 2 combined with the history that was available regarding the drafting of
the relevant section to be highly persuasive in finding that a state could, in compliance with the
mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment, deny ex-felons the right to vote.

48

The court concluded "that the understanding of those who adopted the Fourteenth
Amendment ... and [] the historical and judicial interpretation of the Amendment's applicability
to state laws disenfranchising felons, [was] of controlling significance in distinguishing such
laws from those other limitations on the franchise which have been held invalid under the Equal

43

/d. at 27.
/d. at 33.
45
ld. at 33-34.
46
ld. 41-42.
47
ld. at 43-55.
44

at

48

Rich~rdson, 418 U.S. at 54-55.
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Protection Clause.',49 The Court ultimately held that based upon the language of Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment the Supreme Court of California erred in holding that the state could n;ot
deny ex-felons the right to vote. 5°
It is noteworthy that in the opinion, Justice Rehnquist never discusses the standard ?f

review. Rather, without ever getting into strict scrutiny analysis, which would seem to be t~e
appropriate standard for reviewing the denial of a fundamental right, the majority relies solely
upon the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment to find that a state can deny, even

e~

felons, the right to vote. 5 1 This is important for two reasons. First, in a discussion of the debate
between positive rights and negative rights, one of the key factors regarding negative rights is the
other safeguards in place when a fundamental right is defined negatively in the Constitution. For
example, one may argue that in the US, positive rights are unnecessary because in the US, courts
review the denial of a fundamental right under strict scrutiny, which has been said to be "strict ·m
theory, fatal in fact." 52 This exacting standard of scrutiny would seem to be sufficient for
protecting fundamental rights. However, Richardson highlights the problem with negative rights
and the standard of review approach to dealing with the abridgment of fundamental rights.
Having a right defined negatively, implies that there are limits, which makes it much
easier for courts to justify taking away the right. Furthermore, as Richardson reveals, if the
Supreme Court is willing to so easily sidestep the appropriate standard of review in dealing with
fundamental rights, then tiered review is no protection at all and makes negative rights all the
more susceptible to abridgment. If strict scrutiny is truly going to protect negative rights then it
must be consistently employed and not casually sidestepped. If one accepts that negative rights

49

/d. at 54.
/d. at 56.
51
/d. at 43-56.
50

52

Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact, 59 VAND. L REV. 798-799 (2006).

12

do come with inherent flaws regarding the right to vote, the next logical question then becomes
what is the best alternative. There are two logical alternatives which are discussed in tum: (1)
defining the right statutorily or (2) as a positive, affirmative right.

Ill.

PRISONER DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

In debating the alternatives to negative rights for defining the right to vote in a
constitution, the two other most commonly discussed alternatives are a statutory right and a
positive or affirmative right. While both have their unique strengths and weaknesses generally
speaking, every country may find their own justifications for choosing one form over the other.
This next section looks at the right to vote in India which is provided by statute and then looks at
two countries that provide the right to vote, along with the bulk of their other rights positively Canada and South Africa.

a. India and the Right to Vote
The primary structure of India's Constitution is positive in nature. 53 It confers a variety
of rights upon its citizens including the positive right to free speech and expression, peaceable
assembly, freedom of movement, and free education to children from the age of six to fourteen.

54

Despite conferring such a wide variety of affirmative rights upon its citizens, India's Constitution
is silent regarding the right to vote. 55 The reason for this is because the right to vote in India
"has been held to be a statutory right and not a common law right" and is conferred only by
statute.56 "It is pure and simple a statutory right." 57

53

See INDIA CONST., Jan. 26, 1950, Part III-IV, art. 14-51.
ld. at Part Ill, art. 19-22, 29-31.
55
See INDIA CONST., Jan. 26, 1950.
56
Pradhan v. Union of India & Ors, (1997) S.C.R., at 4 (India).
54

57

/d.
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In Pradhan v. Union OfIndia & Ors, the relevant law prevented a person from voti.ng in
any election if he or she was confined in a prison or otherwise in legal custody of the police.

58

Because India's Constitution is silent on the right to vote, the law was challenged as violating
Articles 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution.59 Articles 14 and 21 provide to Indian Citizens the
right to equality and due process respectively. 60 The Court stated that ''the challenge to the
constitutional validity of[the law was] based primarily on Article 14" and rejected the Article 21
due process claim.61
In challenging the law, the petitioner prisoners argued specifically that the law that
denied the right to vote to people in police custody was significantly over broad because it
denied people the right to vote who were being detained for any reason whatsoever no matter
how trivial the offense.62 In reviewing the petitioner's challenge to the law the Court employed
its standard of review for a denial of any right under Article 14.

In India, a reasonable

classification is permitted when it "has a rational nexus with the object of classification."63 The
Court's analysis primarily focused on whether or not the classification was reasonable. 64
The Court said that the aim of the laws that prevented persons with criminal backgrounds
from voting was to prevent the criminalization of politics and to maintain the integrity of
elections.

65

The Court accepted these objectives and opined that these goals must be welcomed

and upheld as furthering the asserted purpose.66 After the Court acknowledged that the purpose
had a rational nexus with the object of the classification, the Court explained that the amount of
58

/d. at 1-2.
/d. at 2.
60
INDIA CONST., Jan. 26, 1950, Part III-IV, art. 14 and 21.
61
Pradhan, (1997} S.C.R., at 4-5 (India).

59

62

/d. at 3.
ld. at 2-3.
64
/d. at 4-5
65 /d.
63

66

Pradhan, (1997) S.C.R., at 3 (India).
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discretion available to the legislature in instituting a classification depends upon the context in
which the enactment exists. 67 The Court said that the criminalization of politics was ''the bane of
society and negation of democracy." 68 The Court found that the law so far ~hould be upheld as
rationally connected to its aims and that it was enacted in an appropriate context.
Finally, and most importantly, the Court discussed the history ofvoti~g rights in India.69
"[T]he nature of the right to vote has been held to be a statutory right and ·not a common law
right."70 Based upon prior cases it is clear that voting rights in India are "a creature of statute or
special law and must be subject to the limitations imposed by it."71 Furthermore, the Court
entirely rejected the notion that the Fundamental Rights Articles of the Indian Constitution had
any relevance on a right created by statute. 72 Voting in India "is a special right and can only be
exercised on the conditions laid down by the statute [and the] Fundamental Rights [Articles
have] no bearing on a right like this created by statute."73 The Court concluded:
In view of the settled law on the point, it must be held that the right to vote is
subject to the limitation imposed by the statute which can be exercised only in the
manner provided by the statute; and that the challenge to any provision of the
statue prescribing the nature of the right to elect cannot be made with reference to
a fundamental right in the Constitution. The very basis of [the] challenge to the
validity of [the law] is, therefore, not available and this petition must fail.
Consequently, this petition is dismissed. 74
Based upon the fact that the fatal flaw to this challenge in India was the fact that the right
to vote was nowhere contained in the Constitution and thus not subject to constitutional
safeguards, it is clear that a country who wants to protect its citizens' right to vote should not

67 /d.
68/d.
69
70

/d. at 4.
/d.

71/d.
72
Pradhan, {1997) S.C.R., at 4-5 (India).
73
/d. at 5.
74
/d. at 5.
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prefer conferring the right statutorily through the legislative process. Although some may argue
that other countries may protect a statutory right to vote more than the Supreme Court of India
did, with the history of legislative deference throughout the world, and most certainly in the
United States, there is no justification for gambling on such an important right by leaving it to a
legislature. The result that is almost certain to follow is that when a legislature confers a right, a
legislature may take it away and the courts will not intervene.

b. Canada and the Right to Vote
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is primarily a constitution of positive
rights. 75 For example, the Charter outlines in detail a list of"Fundamental Freedoms" including
freedom of conscience and religion, thought, belief, opinion, expression, freedom of the press,
peaceable assembly and association. 76 In addition to these fundamental rights, Canadians are
also entitled to a substantial number of other rights also defined affirmatively such as language
rights, educational rights, equality rights and legal rights. 77 The right to vote in Canada can be
found in the Canadian Charter under "Democratic Rights."78
Concerning the right to vote in Canada, the Charter states that "[e]very citizen of Canada
has the right to vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or of a legislative
assembly and to be qualified for membership therein." 79 "The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. " 80 This is

75

See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 being Schedule B to the
Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.).
76
/d. at Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 2 (U.K.).
n /d. at c. 16-23 (U.K.).
78
/d. at c. 3 (U.K.).
79/d.
80

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 being Schedule B to the Canada
Act, 1982 c. 3-5 (U.K.) (emphasis added).
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the only standard of review available for courts to employ in Can.ada in evaluating an
infringement of a right. Thus, anytime there is an attempt to infringe upon the rights contained
in the Charter, the government will have a heavy burden to overcome.

In Sauve v. Canada, the task of overcoming this burden was highlighted when a law that
denied the right to vote to "[e]very person who is imprisoned in a correctional institution serving
a sentence of two years or more" was challenged by Richard Sauve. 81 The law was passed
following a prior Canadian Supreme Court ruling that struck down a similar law that denied the
right to every person imprisoned in a correctional institution regardless of the length of the
sentence. 82

In analyzing the law, Chief Justice McLachlin began by emphasizing the importance of
voting rights in Canada. "The right of every citizen to vote, guaranteed by . . . the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, lies at the heart of Canadian democracy." 83 The Canadian
Supreme Court engaged in a twofold analysis. The Court asked ( 1) whether the challenged law
infringed upon a right of the citizens and (2) if it did infringe upon a right, whether the
infringement could be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 84 If it could not
be justified the law would be struck down and if it could, the law would be sustained. In
determining whether or not the law can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society the court asks whether the infringing law "achieves a constitutionally valid purpose or
objective, and [whether] the chosen means are reasonable and demonstrably justified."85
This two-part inquiry - the legitimacy of the objective and the proportionality of
the means - ensures that a reviewing court examine rigorously all aspects of
justification. Throughout the justification process, the government bears the
81

Sauve v. Canada, 3 [2002] S.C.R. 519, para. 3-7.
Sauve v. Canada, 7 O.R. (3d) (C.A.) aka "Sauve No. I"
83
Sauve, 3 S.C.R. at 519, para. 9.
84
/d. at 519, para. 7.
82

as

/d.
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burden of proving a valid objective and showing that the rights violation is
warranted - that is, that it is rationaiiy connected, causes minimal impairment,
and is proportionate to the benefit achieved.86
For the purposes of the argument, the Government conceded that the law infringed upon
the guaranteed right of ail citizens to vote. 87 Thus, the Court focused their entire analysis on
whether or not the law was rational and could be justified.88 The Court defined and explained
the right to vote in Canada. 89 It is important to note the significance the Court placed on the
language used in the Canadian Charter to define the right to vote. For example, in explaining the
paramount importance of individual voting rights in Canada, the Court explained that the framers
of the Charter indicated the unique importance of voting by using broad, untrammeled

/anguage. 90 The Court explained that because the right was defined so clearly there could be no
presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a law proscribing the right. 91 "This Court has
repeatedly held that the 'general claim that the infringement of a right is justified ... does not
warrant deference to Parliament ... rather, it requires the state to justify such limitations."92
The government argued that denying inmates the right to vote was simply a matter of
social and political philosophy and thus it was fully appropriate for the legislature to enact laws
that reflected the majority opinion on the issue.93 In addition to declining to show any deference
to the legislature on the issue, the Court also proclaimed that the rights contained in the Canadian
Charter "are not a matter of privilege or merit, but a function of membership in the Canadian
polity that cannot be lightly cast aside."94 "It is for the courts, unaffected by the shifting winds
86/d.
87

/d. at 519, para. 6.
88/d.
89
Sauve, 3 S.C.R. at 519, para. 9-11.
90
ld. at 519, para. 11 (emphasis added).
91
/d. at 519, para. 12.
92/d.
93/d.
94/d.
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of public opinion and electoral interests, to safeguard the right to vote." 95 After outlining the
principles of judicial review of fundamental rights under the Charter, the Court concluded ''that
the government's stated objectives of promoting civic responsibility, respect for the law and
imposing appropriate punishment, while problematically vague, [were] capable in principle of
justifying limitations on Charter rights." 96 Despite accepting the government's stated objectives
as legitimate, the Court then held that the government failed to establish proportionality of the
law because there was a lack of a rational connection between denying inmates the right to vote
and the identified goals. 97
Under Canada's proportionality and rationality analysis, the government is required to
show the denial of a right will further the objectives put forth. 98 The denial of the right cannot be
denied any further than is necessary and the benefits of denying the right must outweigh the
negative impacts. 99 The first question the court asked under the proportionality review was
whether denying inmates the right to vote increased respect for the law. 100 The government
advanced three theories on this point: ( 1) taking away the right to vote sent an educative message
about the importance of the right to vote, (2) allowing inmates to vote was demeaning to the
political system, and (3) that this was a legitimate and reasonable punishment for committing a
crime. 101
The Court in turn rejected all three of the government's theories. First, the Court replied,
this "message is more likely to harm than to help respect for the law." 102 Second, the idea that
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allowing those who disobey the law to vote would demean the political system is an ancient and
obsolete belief. 103 "Denial ;of the right to vote on the basis of attributed moral unworthiness is
inconsistent with the respect for the dignity of every person that lies at the heart of Canadian
democracy and the Charter~" 104 Finally, the Court rejected the government's third argument.
The Court stated, that whe~ the government's final argument was stripped of all its rhetoric it
amounted to a new tool in the arsenal of punishments - denial of constitutional rights. 105 The
Court then convincingly explained that accepting this argument from the government would be
tantamount to accepting the argument that prisoners are not protected by the Canadian Charter. 106
The government certainly could not pass a law denying the right of prisoners to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment, the freedom of religion, or freedom of expression. 107 The Court
then asked rhetorically why the right to vote was any different. 108 The Court concluded by
holding that the law could not be justified in a free and democratic society. 109
Although the Court's analysis was certainly exhaustive and thorough in Sauve, it is
important to take special note of the role that positive rights played in the Court's analysis. One
of the government's arguments rejected by the Court was that the law helped create a sense of
"civic responsibility." 110 In support of this argument, the government attempted to justify the
law by analogizing the law with laws that prevented youth from voting. 111 The Court replied that
this analogy was inaccurate because in the instance of youth voting rights, the government is not
saying that the class who is denied the right is unworthy of voting, but rather they are making a
103
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decision based on the life experience of the citizen. 112 In the case of prisoners' voting rights
being denied, there is a moral judgment being made which cannot be tolerated under the
Charter. 113 The Court pronounced that this was not the lawmakers' decision to make. 114 "The
Charter makes this decision for us by guaranteeing the right of 'every citizen' to vote and by
expressly placing prisoners under the protective umbrella of the Charter through constitutional

limits on punishment." 115 Thus, the prisoners are protected just like any other citizen, "and short
of a constitutional amendment, lawmakers cannot change this." 116
It is clear that in Canada not only is the source of the right (i.e. a constitution versus a
statutory right) extremely important, but also the language used to express it. Thus it is clear that
in at least one country, defining the right to vote in a specific, affirmative manner affords more
protection to the individual citizen than a statutory or negative constitutional right, even if that
citizen is a felon or ex-felon.

c. South Africa and the Right to Vote
The South African Constitution has been widely regarded as the model of a positive
rights constitution. It certainly contains a long list of affirmative rights including some rights
that stand out as unique in comparison to other constitutions. 117 For example, the South African
Constitution, in addition to providing traditional rights such as freedom of religion, expression,
belief and association, also provides for the rights of trade, occupation, profession, healthcare,
food, water and access to government information. 118 The political rights that are possessed by
South African citizens are also substantial. In South Africa, "Every adult citizen has the right to
112
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vote in elections for any legislative body established in tenns of the Constitution, and to do so in
secret." 119 South Africa's Constitution provides that voting and a national common voters' roll
is one of the foremost values on which the country was founded. 120 This language makes clear
that voting rights in South Africa are considered to be of the u~ost importance.
In August and Another v. Electoral Commission and Ot_hers, the Court dealt specifically
with a law denying prisoners' their voting rights. 121 The relevant law denied the right t<? vote to
all prisoners who were convicted of a crime that resulted in: detention in prison without the
option for a fine and also from any prisoner who committed murder, robbery, and rape or
attempted any of these crimes. 122
Two prisoners, one serving a sentence for fraud and the other un-sentenced awaiting trial
also on fraud charges, "sought an undertaking from the [Election] Commission that [they] would
be able to take part in the elections." 123 The Commission responded by stating that they would
not oppose the application of the voters to vote in any election and in fact would take measures
to enable the prisoners to vote. 124 The decision of the Commission was then challenged in court
and the Transvaal High Court delivered an opinion explaining that the Commission should not
undertake the efforts to enable the prisoners to vote. 125 The Transvaal Court relied upon what
they referred to as the "insunnountable logistical, financial and administrative difficulties" in
striking down the prisoners' request for voting accommodations. 126 The Court further reasoned
that because the prisoners' logistical difficulties in voting were of their own making, special
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accommodations enabling them to vote were unnecessary. 127
accommo~ate

"[S]pecial measures to

voters should be reserved for those voters 'whose predicament was not of their

own maki~g. '" 128
Th~

prisoners then appealed the decision of the Transvaal Court to the Constitutional

Court of South Africa. 129 The prisoners' sought "an order declaring that they and all prisoners
[were] entitled to register as voters on the national common voters' roll and to vote in the
forthcoming general elections, and requiring the respondents to make all necessary arrangements
to enable them and all prisoners to do so." 130 Interestingly, the prisoners argued that not only did
the South .African Constitution require that they be allowed to vote; they also argued that the
Election Commission was affirmatively obligated ''to create conditions enabling them to vote ...
and make the necessary arrangements for these rights to be realized." 131
The Constitutional Court noted in their opinion that the right to vote, by design, imposes
upon the legislature and the executive affirmative obligations. 132 For example, election dates
must be set, secret ballots and machinery must be established, and officials must manage the
elections on Election Day. 133 The Court said that in addition to these affirmative obligations, the
right to vote in South Africa certainly imposes on the Election Commission, which was created
to carry-out these affirmative duties, the responsibility "to take reasonable steps to ensure that
eligible voters are registered." 134 The Court then transitioned from explaining the requirements
imposed on the Commission to recounting the significance of voting rights in South Africa. 135
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"Universal adult suffrage on a common voters roll is one of the foundational values of
our entire constitutional order." 136 The Court stated that voting rights were essential to acquiring
rights and for effective citizenship. 137 Furthermore, the Court explained that voting rights say
that everybody counts and are also a badge of dignity. 138 "In a country of great disparities of
wealth and power it declares that whoever we are, whether rich or poor, exalted or disgraced, we
all belong to the same democratic South African nation; that our destinies are intertwined in a
single interactive polity." 139

In reviewing the Court's opinion in August, it is important to note the complete lack of
deference to the legislature. The Court went out if its way to note that when dealing with the
right to vote, "the franchise must be interpreted in favor of enfranchisement rather than
disenfranchisement." 140 The Court also contrasted the right to vote with other rights that are
inherently restricted by incarceration. 141 For example, the Court said that prisoners "no longer
have freedom of movement and have no choice regarding the place of imprisonment." In
addition, "contact with the outside world is limited" and prisoners "must submit to the discipline
of prison life and to the rules and regulations which prescribe how they must conduct themselves
and how they are to be treated while in prison." 142 So it is clear that the Court in South Africa
acknowledges and accepts that there is a denial of important rights by the very fact of one's
incarceration however, this will not justify a complete denial of all constitutional rights in South
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Africa. ''Nevertheless, there is a substantial residue of basic rights which [prisoners] may not be
denied; and if they are denied them, then they are entitled to legal redress." 143
The Court acknowledged that "the idea that murderers, rapists and armed robbers should
be entitled to vote will offend many people": however "the task of this Court is to ensure that
fundamental rights and democratic processes are protected." 144 The Court concluded by leaving
open the possibility that the right to vote could potentially be taken away from certain categories
of criminals however, to do so the law must be drawn very narrowly and only strike at a very
specific class of criminals and the law must also serve a legitimate purpose. 145
IV.

CONCLUSION: POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE RIGHTS-WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE?

It is clear that the language used to express citizens' voting rights is important and does

make a difference when the right is challenged. The right of citizens to participate in the
political processes of their respective country can be established by a variety of methods, means,
and language. The purpose of this article is to show that these choices matter, and once the
choice is made it is often hard to correct any flaws or weaknesses that are later realized in the
choice.
Returning to Jackson, seventeen year old Jerry Ross and sixteen year old Sandra Jackson,
who was six months pregnant, were involved in a serious car accident. 146 A City of Joliet police
officer arrived at the scene of the accident and made no attempts to determine whether anyone
was in the car or rescue either of the passengers. 147 Rather, as the car began to burn, the police
officer called the fire department and directed traffic around the scene of the accident. 148 The
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fire department arrived, put out the fire and only then realized that Ross and Jackson were still in
the car. 149 Jackson was taken to the hospital where she was pronounced dead along with her
fetus while Ross was left in the vehicle. 150 He was later removed by a tow-truck driver and
pronounced dead. 151
The families of Ross and Jackson sued the City of Joliet, alleging that they could have
been saved if the police officer had aided Ross and Jackson, or at least called an ambulance
immediately. 152 Judge Posner suggested that if there was a claim to be brought it was ''under the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause." 153

Judge Posner explained there were two

possible theories under the Fourteenth Amendment by which a claim could be brought: (1) that
the deceased were entitled to some level of positive rights under the Constitution or (2) that the
negligent acts of the personnel of the City of Joliet constituted a deprivation of life without due
process of law. 154
Judge Posner rejected both possibilities. 155 Specifically, in regard to the first argument,
Judge Posner dismissed it simply by stating ''that the Constitution is a charter of negative rather
than positive liberties." 156 "It is enough to note that, as currently understood, the concept of
liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include a right to basic services, whether
competently provided or otherwise." 157 Judge Posner rejected the due process claim explaining
that only an intentional tort would suffice to successfully bring the claim. 158
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This case, combined with the voting rights cases from the US, Canada and South Africa
illustrates the impact that a positive right can have as opposed to a negative right. There are
strong arguments against positive rights and in favor of the negative rights approach. Two
arguments that are common in opposing positive rights are (1) the "floodgates" argument and (2)
the "slippery slope" argument. 159
The floodgates theory suggests that if cases such as Jackson are successfully brought,

°

many others will arise. 16

Courts then will be engaged in the . process of evaluating and

determining how governments should do their jobs. 161 However, in opposing this argument, one
can look to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. If positive rights are allowed, doctrines such as
sovereign immunity would still survive and the courts would be focused on whether the branches
of government are "transgressing the rights of individuals."
Furthermore, the floodgates theory has little place in the discussion of voting rights. This
is for two reasons. First, elections in the US already place affirmative obligations on government
entities.

As the South African Supreme Court explained in rejecting the attempts to

disenfranchise prisoners in August, election dates must be set, secret ballots and machinery must
be established, and officials must manage the elections on Election Day. 162 This occurs in the
US as well. Except for the fact that based on current interpretations of voting rights in the US,
the government is not required to do these things, it is clear that the US is very capable of
handling elections in the US. Second, the right to vote is a fundamental right. It seems that
where a right is fundamental it would be reasonable to expect a increased burden on the
government to see that the right is not only protected from abridgment but also realized by the
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citizens. So while the floodgates argument may hold weight in a discussion of the best overall
structure for a constitution it is less persuasive when it comes to the discussion of voting rights.
The "Slippery Slope" argument posits that once a constitution allows the "government to
do anything but leave [citizens] alone, [they] will end with it coercing [them] to obey its idea of
freedom." 163 "In the constitutional realm, the argument is that once [it is held] that due process
requires the government to perform a statutorily mandated duty to protect a known individual
from threatened harm, [citizens] will next be forcing cities to create police and fire departments
and will ultimately be guaranteeing every person a living wage and enough to eat." 164 Again,
just as the floodgates argument, this argument has merit regarding the overall structure of a
constitution. The argument carries less weight however when discussing a single fundamental
right, such as voting.

By requiring the government to facilitate voting, by affirmative

obligations, citizens are guaranteed that the government will always have to provide the one right
that operates as a check on its power: voting. This can prevent the "parade of horribles" that
those who argue against positive rights, claim will follow if positive rights are realized.
Although there are other arguments against positive constitutional rights, these two
arguments provide an accurate portrayal of the essence of most of arguments. They all tend to
focus on the issue of the logical stopping point when a constitution does provide positive rights.
The major flaw in this argument is that it proceeds as if positive constitutional rights are an all or
nothing proposition. The reality is that it is possible to provide some rights affirmatively and
others negatively. Furthermore, some rights, such as the right to vote, are so essential to a
democracy that they should hold a unique position within a constitution, meaning that even if the
overall structure of the constitution is negative, the right to vote should still always be a positive
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right.

Accordingly, arguments that create the impression that positive rights will lead to

unsustainable government obligations should be accorded less weight in regards to the right to
vote.
V.

CONSTITUTIONAL VOTING RIGHTS TODAY AND RECOMMENDATIONS GOING FORWARD

a. Domestically
The US Supreme Court recently struck down the core of the landmark 1965 Voting
Rights Act (the Act), legislation that was aimed at stopping "an insidious and pervasive evil
which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious
defiance of the Constitution." 165 In striking down the most significant parts of the Act, the Court
noted that while voting discrimination still exists, the conditions which justified the Act in 1965
no longer exist today. 166 The Court also stated that the Act "imposes substantial federalism costs
and differentiates between the States, despite our historic tradition that all states enjoy equal
sovereignty." 167 The Court concluded the opinion by opining that their decision "in no way
affects . the permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting" however the
protections created by the 1965 Voting Rights Act's coverage formula could no longer be
justified. 168
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Shelby County, it is essential to look at
the safeguards that are in place to protect a citizen's right to vote in the US. One ofthe likely
results of Shelby County is that there will be many more attempts to disenfranchise voters in the
US. There already have been noteworthy attempts by states to interfere with the voting rights of
Americans by passing laws requiring voter identification and other requirements, under the guise
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of preventing fraud in elections. 169 However, many of these laws are aimed more at voter
suppression rather than the prevention of fraud in elections.
Although the full force of the Supreme Court's decision in Shelby County has yet to be
realized, it is clear that the decision, at a minimum will give states more leeway in handling
elections. In the US, states have always had "broad powers to determine the conditions under
which the right of suffrage may be exercised." 170 Prior to Shelby County, the Supreme Court
upheld voter identification laws in lndiana 171 and in Arizona. 172 Other attempts have also been
made to do the same in states such as Pennsylvania, Florida and South Carolina. 173 While the
laws in Pennsylvania, Florida and South Carolina were never successfully implemented, they
were all introduced prior to the Shelby County decision and thus it stands to be seen whether
renewed attempts would be successful.

It seems under the Court's renewed embrace of

federalism over individual voting rights, deference to these laws will once again become a hurdle
for those whose rights are threatened by state election laws.
With such sly attempts to interfere with voting rights, it is essential that Americans
always stay alert to attempts to disenfranchise some classes of voters and also the constitutional
protections afforded those who are potentially affected. Although voting is a fundamental right
in the US, it is clear that the US Constitution is not as protective of voting rights as some other
constitutions throughout the world. Realistically, an amendment in the US declaring voting to be
a positive right is unlikely. However, it is still a worthy endeavor to explore the positive
alternative to the negative right as a means of understanding the strengths and weaknesses of
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both so that one is well equipped to engage in the legal battles that can protect citizens' voting
rights.

b. Internationally
Much can be gained by evaluating the constitutional protections afforded a citizen via
their respective constitution.

The relevance today internationally is that countries in their

constitutional infancy should reevaluate the status of the right to vote under their constitution.
Where it is believed necessary to strengthen the right to vote, attempts to amend the constitution
should be made sooner than later. The longer a country waits to amend a constitution, the more
challenging the already onerous process is. In addition, countries that have yet to formulate their
constitution ·would be well advised to provide for strong constitutional protections for the right to
vote. Countries such as Egypt, who may very well be in the midst of a constitutional moment,
would be well advised to adopt .strong protections for voting rights because they are preservative
of other fundamental rights and also are an effective check on govemment. 174
In looking at the choices that a country has when making a decision regarding a
constitution and the right to vote the three most important choices that must be made are (1)
whether to confer the right primarily by a constitution or statutorily; (2) once the first choice has
been made whether to opt for a positive right or negative right, and finally (3) whether to utilize
specific or generalized language in articulating the right.

c. Constitutional Rights or Statutory Rights?
Pradhan, clearly reveals the dangers that arise when a country chooses to confer

important rights via the legislative process as opposed to a constitution. Although many argue
that this is a more efficient way of handling the conferring of rights, the case demonstrates how
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little deference is given to the citizens claims and how much deference is given to the legislature.
When dealing with statutory rights in India, all that is needed for the government to take away
the right from a citizen is a classification that has a rational nexus with the object of the
classification. This highly deferential standard is an analogue to rational basis review in the US.
Thus, as was highlighted by Pra(jhan, citizens should not get too comfortable with their statutory
rights because those rights which are provided by a legislature can just as easily be taken away
by a legislature.
In contrast to statutory rights are constitutional rights, which were the subject of the cases
discussed in the US, Canada and South Africa. It is evident from the language used in discussing
the constitutional rights of these countries that any attempts to take away the right to vote in
these countries will have a much higher hurdle to overcome than one would in India. In the US,
one must meet strict scrutiny when dealing with a fundamental right by showing that the
government has a compelling interest and that the means of achieving this is narrowly tailored. 175
In Canada, the law must be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 176 In South
Africa the law must be one of general application and reasonable and justifiable in an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. 177 These three standards are
all much less deferential to the government and place a more onerous burden on the government
to justify infringing the right.
Based upon the review the case law from India and by comparison with the US, Canada
and South Africa, the answer to the question of which method of providing rights is more
protective of the rights given and thus more desirable is that a constitution is preferable due to its
ability to provide greater protection. Constitutions are almost always more protective because
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they demand a more stringent standard of review to legal challenges and they are harder to
change than statutory rights. What then is the preferred structure of a constitution? Positive,
which is the structure of the constitutions of Canada and South Africa, or negative as is the case
in the US. This is discussed below.

d. Positive or Negative Rights?
Once it has been determined that a constitution is the preferred method of conferring
rights to a country's citizenry, the next question is what constitutional structure should the
country choose? The two most commonly adhered to forms are positive and negative. As
previously mentioned, it is fairly easy to conclude that constitutions are more protective of rights
than statutory laws.

But which is more protective of rights when it comes to competing

constitutional structures? The negative model, as exemplified by the US Constitution, can be
protective but suffers from one main flaw - the nature of the negative model only says what
government cannot do which inherently implies that some things can be done by the government
to the citizens' rights. By contrast, the positive model, as exemplified by Canada and South
Africa starts from the premise that the right is absolute.
Although standards of review are present in the Canadian and South African
constitutions, it is much harder to take away constitutional rights in these countries because they
are clearly articulated in an affirmative way. All that is necessary in these countries is the
existence of the right in the constitution and the full force of constitutional protection is in place.
By contrast, under the US negative model, a whole series of questions will be asked before it is
determined what standard of review will be applied, i.e. rational basis, intermediate, or strict
scrutiny. Questions such as is there a suspect class, is this a fundamental right and what is the
purpose of the law? Furthermore, one of the flaws in the ad hoc creation of standards of review
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in the US is that the US Supreme Court has at times completely sidestepped any standard of
review as occurred in Richardson. This is much more difficult to do under the positive rights
model, especially when there is only one standard of review clearly articulated in the constitution
itself.
If one accepts that certain rights, such as the right to vote, should receive greater
protections from abridgment, then the best choice for accomplishing this goal is by choosing a
positive rights constitutiona l structure either as a whole or for the specific ri ghts deemed most
fundamental by the country. This takes much of the "guesswork" out of the review of the laws at
issue and avoids questions such as what the drafters inte nded and also the prob lems of
disagreement on what privileges the right articulated actually provides .

Put simp ly, te lling

someone what they have is much easier than telling someone only what cannot be done to them.

e. Specific or Generalized Language?
Since there is ample evidence in place to supp01t the conclusion that constitutions s hould
be preferred over statutory rights and that positive constitutional structures should be preferred
over negative ones at least regarding the right to vote, the final question to be asked is w hether
the rights identified in the constitution should be articulated by very clear and specific language
or more general language allowing for judicial flexibility when interpreting the right.
When it comes to the language chosen to articu late a voting right, clear specific language
is the better alternative. There is one caveat to thi s. If clear specific language is chosen, the
draftees of the constitution must have the foresight to draft the re levant rights in a manner that
does not later yearn for more. Assuming this can be done, a very clear and specific art iculation
of a particular right in a constitution can protect against na rrow interpretational approaches to
lessening a right. Vague and general language is a swinging door. This design can al low a court

34

to interpret a law broadly and liberally which can make up for any inadequacies in the drafting of
the constitution. This same feature can also result in courts interpreting language very narrowly
which could result in the exact same language lessening a citizen's right. A country should not
gamble with generalized language because this could lead to courts justifying restrictions of
rights by judicial interpretation.
Regardless of the overall constitutional structure (positive, negative, specific language
versus general) chosen by a country, the right to vote in any democracy should receive
disproportionate treatment in how the right is expressed and the process by which potential
limitations on the right are analyzed by the country's highest court. The right should receive the
greatest protections that a Constitution can provide. This is not to say that the right to vote
should be absolute. However, when restricting such a paramount right, the one who seeks to
take it away should have a heavy task in front of them. Such an approach is the only approach
that is consistent with countries who proclaim the superior nature of democracy and voting.
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